Kieran Healy

What’s Happening in Iran?

There’s a good deal of talk about the student protests in Iran. It ranges from informative lists of sources to empty point-scoring.

I want to know more about the state of the ruling political classes in Iran. This is because, reflexive cheap shots against the social sciences notwithstanding, the political sociology of revolutions is a pretty well-developed field with some good theory. It was revived in the late sixties by Barrington Moore’s classic Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. The work of scholars like Theda Skocpol, Jack Goldstone, Chuck Tilly, Jeff Goodwin and many others has given us a solid understanding of the conditions under which successful revolutions happen.

One of the most robust findings from this literature is that protests won’t do it by themselves. Popular revolutionary movements generally will not succeed if the groups in control of the state remain unified and keep control of the means of organized violence. (Look at China in 1988, for instance.) Revolutions are usually precipitated by a crisis within the state and its ruling classes. Some kind of structural pressure—economic problems, geopolitical instability—produces fiscal strain on the state and may precipitate severe divisions within the elite. Maybe there’s a conflict between state bureaucrats and the class that provides most of the state tax revenue, for example. Whatever it is, in some cases elite conflict over fiscal or geopolitical problems may lead to less-than-effective repression of popular protest, or an alliance between some fragment of the elite and a revolutionary protest movement. But it seems like you need that elite division and malfunctioning state bureaucracy. Sheer inequality often won’t produce protest, and sheer protest won’t produce revolution.

So, I want to know how the Iranian state is doing and how much intra-elite conflict there is. Some of the background conditions seem to be there. Iran has a huge population under age 30, and this is often a cause of social and thus political strain. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has certainly upset the geopolitics of the region, and the U.S. seems to be putting more pressure on the Iranian regime than before. From the reports in the newspapers, though, the government so far seems well in control of the means of violence. For as long as that remains so, the prospects for successful revolution are not so good.

Update: John Lemon, James Joyner and the commenters to this post have followed up with their thoughts. I’m presently hanging out in DFW airport on my way to Boston. I read an article about Iran in the Economist on my way here, and found that they’re similarly skeptical about the prospect of a big uprising which, of course, doesn’t mean it’s out of the question. An Iranian correspondent (living abroad) emails to say that while popular discontent is high, so is the state’s capacity for repression—though the police may be a little more sympathetic to the protestors. He or she also says it’s important to pay attention to the source of stories and commentary on Iran, as the factions-in-exile don’t like each other much.

YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION?

Kieran Healy summarizes the social science literature on revolutions (with links and everything) to explain why the current student protests in Iran probably won’t lead…

I agree that we need to know these things, and any assessment of the current situation has to turn on a knowledge of these specific facts and issues.

Though on the other hand, it often seems to me that modern revolutions are also historical singularities in some ways: there are some things that generally seem common to each, but each also turns out to be a confluence of many factors, some of which look predictable only in retrospect and which seem unreproducible in other times and other places. It wouldn’t appear from the outside that some of the important necessary conditions for revolutionary upheaval in Iran are present—but at the same time, the existence of meaningful mass protest of some kind says there is something important going on in urban Iranian civil society, that the current ruling elite is either secretly sympathetic to such protest or for some complicated reason unable to squash it outright through unrestrained use of terror and repression.

Why is my piece empty point-scoring? Who am I scoring a point for? Iranian students? Liberal hawks? Conservatives? What the heck are you talking about?

…and Skocpol did such a terrific job predicting the first Iranian revolution! (I refer to Skocpol’s follow up article to her book where she twists and turns quite a bit.)

BTW, how Skocpol, Tilly, Goldstone and Goodwin (and add to this Gurr) do with Hungary, Poland, Russia, etc.?

I want to know more about the state of the ruling political classes in Iran… how much intra-elite conflict there is

my uninformed opinion is rather a lot. two points of evidence: there’s a striking number of dissident clerics, including those who’ve had roles in the formation of the state, and the parliament seems to be full of reformers, eg there are enough elected reformists to pass a bill allowing khatami to over-ride the guardian council’s judicial review.

i’ve mentioned abodlkarim soroush. i also liked ali ansari’s talk on “Islam and Democracy: Managing Change in Contemporary Iran.”

for some complicated reason unable to squash it outright through unrestrained use of terror and repression.

I can’t seem to find it in a quick search, but Juan Cole has discussed the fact that repressive as teh Iranian state has been, it has largely stayed within its legal limits rather than engaging in extralegal terror.

What happened in 1988 in China?

Michael Totten:
You seem to be trying to score points for your Builders vs Defenders theory.

Marvin,

The point of my piece had next to nothing to do with Builders and Defenders. The point was about the Iranian Revolution and how the anti-war left to its shame is ignoring it.

I’m glad Prof Healy isn’t ignoring it. He is the first and so far only exception to what I was grousing about.

I’d like to see more of it, perhaps without the snarky comments, though.

and how the anti-war left to its shame is ignoring it…. He is the first and so far only exception to what I was grousing about… I’d like to see more of it

i suggest getting the mote out of your eye might help you see more of it.

i’ll also suggest that if you trouble yourself to read some anti-war leftists with natural tans and/or origins in the muslim world, you’ll find very many people who have been attentive to what’s happening in iran.

if you’re offering monetary prizes, i’ll put up my qualification on both anti-war and attending to iran. hey, i protested halabja before the white right got worried about it too.

Internet Primary

Harold Meyerson, Tapped, and Ezra Klein are all writing about Move On’s internet primary. I don’t really have anything to add to what those three have said, except to say that I encourage people to register. Well, I also don’t…

Michael,

“He is the first and so far only exception to what I was grousing about.”

Here’s an article from the antiwar-left on the Iranian uprising that I read the other day:

it was, IIRC, pro-uprising

Counterpunch.org also appears to have articles about Aceh, Peru, Africa and Brazil. Does the current NRO have articles on those places?

Maybe counterpunch can’t jump through all your ideological hoops. But it is part of the “antiwar left”, so now you have two exceptions…

If supporting the student revolutionaries in Iran is an ideological hoop, that’s pretty darn sad. I remember when the left was anti-fascist and the right was not. What happened? This is a serious question.

Michael – OK, maybe I was a bit snarky, but I don’t like your Builders vs Defenders idea, as I’ve written here before. As some of the other comments show, it just can’t be true that I’m the first lefty to write about this topic—I hardly know anything about Iran.

Whoops, looks like my flight is boarding. Gotta run.

The ideological hoop I was referring to is their criticism of Israel. I anticipated you using it to disqualify counterpunch from consideration.

“The point of my piece had next to nothing to do with Builders and Defenders. ”

Actually, I thought the themes were very similar.

It would also be interesting to know how the police and army (the means of organized violence available to the state) are relating to the ayatollahs and to those protesting. IIRC, the old Shah fell to a sudden uprising that was a)massive enough to be uncontrollable and b)in a situation where the police/military did not feel like drowning it in blood (for whatever reasons). Would the same factors be building up today? I see no clues yet.

Kieran,

Oh, be snarky. It’s okay, really. I often play hardball, so I shouldn’t expect leniency.

I don’t mind that you didn’t like the B&D essay. Den Beste didn’t like it either, and he trashed it at length on his page. But I still read his stuff and I don’t take it personally. So long as it isn’t made personal.

I’m glad you’re writing about Iran. I am more optimistic than you about the outcome, but I’m glad you’re writing about it and you’re obviously on the right side of that conflict. (As is nearly everyone else.)

But it’s true that the right pays more attention to this than the left. I wish it weren’t so. I really do.

No, you’re not the only one on the left to write about it. I’m on the left, too. I’m damn hawkish on this war, but otherwise my opinions range from mainstream liberal to radical left. The Terror War is not just for conservatives, and cheering the Iranian Revolution definitely should not be.

It would be better for the right and the left to pay less attention, truly. The political and cultural dynamic inside Iran is complicated by (i) the desire for democracy and (ii) the continuing antipathy (or equivocation) towards the world’s most noteworthy examply of democracy, which is the U.S. So that many who tend to favor liberalization can be persuaded to stand on one side or another of the fence depending on how threatened Iranians are made to feel about the U.S. And when the U.S. directly criticizes Iran (or praises Iranian dissidents), even those who are most in favor of liberalization are put on the extreme defensive and may forego advocating certain “extreme” (by Iranian standards) measures (especially as they relate to women’s rights) in order to show that they are not merely advocating for the “western” lifestyle. Iran has a bifurcated government, with a democratically elected president and assembly that is trumped by a judicial/clerical council. Think of a United States Supreme Court with police and secret servcies at its disposal, so that it can initiate prosecutions of those who violate state norms. The council also has the power to “veto” any reform legislation it doesn’t like. Yes, Iran usually obeys the rule of law, but since some of these laws are so extreme (i.e., stoning converts) that it’s hardly an endorsement of its human rights record. I could go on. Personally, I think it will take at least a decade for Iranian society to liberalize and I don’t think it will be through a revolution. And that’s probably a good thing. Sorry for the rant. I represent Iranian refugees. I don’t see it in terms of social theory at all.

But it’s true that the right pays more attention to this than the left. I wish it weren’t so. I really do. No, you’re not the only one on the left to write about it. I’m on the left, too.

oh, where’s that quote from prof. healy? it’s coming handy again. i quote:

“That’s a seductive rhetoric for embattled liberals. You’re on the side of truth. You are being realistic. The conservatives like you. I’m all in favor of facing unpleasant truths, being a social scientist and all. But what’s so unpleasant about what seems to be the truth here?”

on one hand, i suppose it’s nice that you’ve climbed down from “He is the first and so far only exception to what I was grousing about.” but on the other hand, i see no evidence that mr.totten took my advice about directing his attention to the tanned and/or muslim left.

first one to say “par for the course for white people” is a rotten egg.

Perhaps before anyone “cheers the Iranian Revolution”, they might want to think about the following points:

a) As of August 2001, Iran was arguably stumbling along its way toward peaceful liberalisation. Take a look at the output of the Iranian film industry, or look at contemporary news reports. Khatami was managing the process (both the mullahs and the students) much better than, say, the Nigerians.

b) Then, the “axis of evil speech”. Mullahs immediately panicked and on a siege footing. Repression begins.

c) And now here we are. It is as insulting as it is wrong to suggest that the “student movement” sprang up fully formed two months ago, on seeing the liberation of the Iraqis. What did spring up two months ago were loads of neocon and liberal-hawk “Coalitions For Democracy In Iraq”.

Which leads me to conclude:

i) There would have been no need for a fucking “Iranian Revolution” if the hawks had kept their nose out of the region.

ii) The more “support” from the American government the students get, the more of a rational pretext there is for the mullahs to suspect that they are facing foreign attempts at destabilisation.

iii) If, on the other hand, tje Western world would cool the rhetoric and start to positively engage with Iran again, then maybe things could go back to getting better there. Of course, this would have the disadvantage of not giving us the war we apparently want.

If the charge is that insufficiently many leftists have said “Hurray for the Iranian students”, it’s bollocks. If the charge is that the left is not out in the streets demanding an immediate humanitarian intervention now, then you’re criticising the left for not being more keen on war as a tool of policy and less keen on diplomatic compromise than George W Bush. For crying out loud.

astute points, dsquared.

it’s always the fault of amerikkka, basically.

somebody makes a speech on capitol hill & the poor, terrified mullahs of tehran have to whip out the… well, whips. somebody hosts a cocktail party where freedom of press is talked about & fidel jails dissidents. rumsfeld as much as half squints & kim-il lobs a missile in the general direction of japan.

god knows that without amerikkka, the world would be a much better place.

truly, the monumental idiocy of such stance can & ought to be admired for its consistency.

Dear harm d.: I don’t know where to begin. If the issue is simply one of ego pacification, i.e., who, left or right, is more correct in their stance on Iran, then the answer is, I don’t care. But if the issue is, what is the impact of America on the world, there seems to be a lightheaded lack of focus. GWB went out of his way in the f***ing SOTU address to demonize Iran in the most visible and public way he as at his command, short of invading the place. He continues to do the same. Is he responsible for the mullahs’ resulting crackdown? Most definitely he is not. Indeed, I bet the mullahs wish he would make a few more speeches so they can justify further restrictions. But if GWB really WANTS liberalization in Iran, as opposed to merely scoring political points at home, then he would calibrate his words and actions accordingly. That he has not done so says to me that he is indifferent to the effect of his administration’s policies on Iran. It isn’t that we are evil Amerikka—it’s that we are insular America with very little apparent feel or concern with how mighty we have become and how even seeminly little rhetorical swoops by our leaders can have big consequences for others. Self awareness. Awareness of others. Awareness of how others react to us. This is what I would ask.

dear barbara:

i must confess that i may be just a teensy-weensy bit biased in my appreciation of american involvement in world affairs. not as an american resident, but as aromanian who was born & raised during the worst decade of the ceausescu regime.

let me offer you one of the most popular jokes before, during & after the bloody coup d’etat of december ‘89:

a young czech wakes up to the tune of tanks rumbling through the narrow streets of prague. he peers outside his window & spies stars & stripes fluttering atop all the vehicles. delirious with joy, he thinks the communist regime has been overthrown by american troops. he spills out into the street, manically waving his arms & screaming “freedom, freedom, democracy!”

a tank stops, & a rather phlegmatic soldier pops up from behind a mounted machine gun & cautions the enthusiastic youngster:

“nyet ‘freedom;’ carnival…”

point being: i can’t think of a point in recent history where american “posturing,” “jingoism” & “unilateralism” has been anything but the best out of a bunch of bad options. (don’t even get me started on vietnam, cambodia or nicaragua!)

do i mean mean american foreign policy is or @ any point in time has been a) perfect b) perfectly disinterested? sacre bleu, no! but by any measure of means, american involvement/”occupation” is the best an iraqi, iranian or north korean person can possibly hope for. god knows east-europeans were still wondering where the fabled americans were well into the sixties. well, smoking dope, screwing (both literally as well as figuratively) around & listen to bob dylan whine; that’s where.

meanwhile, asian steppes from the urals to the himalayas & beyond were irrigated w/ the blood of tens and tens and tens of millions of brutally murdered people.

every day, i paste a new picture of a khmer rouge victim in my blog. some of them are children, some of them are women, some of them are old men. most of them are just pixels now; not even their names have survived.

you look @ those pixels, realize how hopelessly lifeless & inert the little dots on the screen are, realize that this is how it looks when an actual human beings stares into a camera minutes before being murdered. look at them! realize the soul-ripping atrocities they represent, & then come back & argue about placating mullahs & indulging the likes of kim-il & castro.

let me channel christopher hitchens here: each day we’ve got mauled students & starving people piling up in contries run by caligula wannabes, & i’m being asked to worry about dubya’s f***ing diction?! do me a favor!

To harm d.:

Game. Set. Match.

>>american involvement/”occupation” is the best an iraqi, iranian or north korean person can possibly hope for

This is absolute nonsense in the case of Iran. Any comparison of the standard of living in Iran in 2001 and Iraq now reveals how ludicrous it is.

Furthermore, you seem to be claiming that the Soviet state committed atrocities in the “tens of millions” during the 1960s when it plainly didn’t.

And I don’t know why you’re bringing up the subject of the Khmer Rouge as an example of virtuous American foreing policy. The Cambodians were saved from Pol Pot by an invasion by the People’s Republic of Viet Nam, and the USA did its level best to destroy the Vietnamese economy as a punishment for doing so.

Dear harm d:

I do not worry about GWB’s diction now and I never have. But his public statements, articulate or otherwise have consequences. If you consider this type of posturing to be the best of an existing set of bad options, my only point would be, we—that is he—could be doing a lot better at posturing without alienating voters at home or harming protesters abroad. It would take subtlety of thought and action, which is to say, you can’t point at everyone who disagrees with you and declare them to be evil. But then, if all you want to do is relive history, assured that things turned out pretty well in Eastern Europe and Cambodia (??), and that, therefore, our jingoistic sentiments didn’t wreck things entirely . . . oh well, please, yes, game set and match (and what an easy contest). I’m still trying to figure out how the people of Uzbekistan are better off now that their fearless leader has become our best friend. But then, I don’t have the benefit of hindsight yet. I’m sure in a decade you’ll be able to clue me in (and what with all those dissidents probably dead by then, there won’t be anyone around to present the counterpoint).